Scholars across academic disciplines have explored the effect of social identification and social identity on different forms of political participation. Social identity differs from social identification conceptually; the latter emphasizes a process, suggesting something in flux, situational and subject to social contexts (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000) . Many studies have found that both can enhance political participation among members of minority groups (Dawson, 1994; Klandermans, 2002; Olsen, 1970; Shingles, 1981; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) . However, the correlation seems neither consistent nor omnipresent, as other studies found no such relationship or only weak effects thereof (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Lien, 1994; Tate, 1991) . According to P erez (2015) , these mixed results present a conundrum: Group identity seems to matter politically as it can be politicized and therefore affect society; however, when and among whom it is politicized is not entirely clear. Lee (2008) promotes "unpacking" the dynamics and assumptions of the identity-to-politics link-that is, making it explicit. The identity-to-politics link assumes that individuals who share a demographic label also share common interests and collectively pursue them through political participation. However, the assumption leaves many questions unanswered, as social identification's effect on political participation is not straightforward. Do individuals self-identify with the categories ascribed to them? What is the underlying mechanism of the politicization of social identification? Additionally, social identification does not necessarily affect political participation since identifying can function merely as a point of self-reference (Lee, 2008) .
Existing research posits that identification with social groups activates political participation under the conditions of perception of shared grievances and connectedness to a superordinate group (Klandermans, 2014; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Klandermans, 2001 ). Simon and Grabow (2010) conceptualize immigrants' combined identification with a social minority (e.g., immigrant group) and the mainstream society (e.g., destination country) as being a dual identity. Alongside perception of shared grievances and this dual identification, group differences can affect how social identification activates political participation by providing varying degrees of political leadership, group resources, and access to recruitment networks. Lastly, all such mechanisms can be affected by the political context.
Our study enriches the existing debate fourfold. First, we integrate ideas from social psychology, political science, sociology, and immigration research to conceptualize the effect immigrants' social identification has on voting in Western Europe. We provide a theoretical framework that puts the conditionality of politicized social identification front and center; here we see that the effect social (and dual) identification has on political participation interacts with perceptions of shared grievances and group differences. We show that the combination of feeling attached to a certain social group and the perception that this group shares grievances in particular contexts can produce different effects on voting likelihood. From this, we gain deeper understanding of when and how social identification can affect voting. Unlike previous studies, by separately analyzing origin country and religious identifications, we consider how the characteristics of the social categories with which individuals self-identify matter. Second, this study conceptualizes-and for the first time, tests-differences across immigrant groups and countries vis-a-vis the politicization of social identification. Third, we take voting as an indicator of political participation, whereas many European studies have focused on other forms of political participation as they relate to social identification (on political protest, see e.g., Klandermans, 2014) . Voting is basic to citizenship rights, enabling individuals to express political opinions in a way that requires little time and money (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) . Finally, we empirically test the effects of origin country and religious identifications on voting probability among a highly politicized group of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe as an exemplary case. This is done by analyzing a unique dataset from surveys conducted for the European research project EURISLAM (2011; Tillie, Koomen, van Heelsum, & Damstra 2013) . Using binary logistic regression, we compare responses from individuals who immigrated to Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom from predominantly Muslim origins in Morocco, Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Pakistan and its region. 1 
Conceptual Framework

Social Identification and Political Participation
Research has shown that social identification plays an important role in individuals' daily lives and their organizational processes. Individuals attach emotional significance to perceived membership in the social groups in which they self-categorize and with which they self-identify. Social identification helps people make sense of their everyday practices and comprehend what they share with others and how they differ from them (e.g., Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Simon, 1999, p. 53; Tajfel, 1981, p. 255; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . Simon and Klandermans (2001, p. 321) argue that along with promoting a sense of belonging and distinctiveness, social identification works to foster respect, understanding, and agency. These psychological functions reflect how social identification affects individuals' everyday lives, which may include political participation. Simon (1999) defines social identity as "a place in society," which is shared with individuals also considered group members. Social identity is therefore always relational, subjected, and context-interactive (Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005; Simon, 1999; Turner et al., 1987) . Simon (1999) shows that social identification's salience is influenced by the numerical distinctiveness of a social characteristic (e.g., whether it is only shared with a minority of individuals) and how meaningful this characteristic is perceived in the social context. Postmes et al. (2005) also note that individuals' social identity can arise if it is differentiated (e.g., from the mainstream society) on the basis of some property held in common with a group of individuals. They argue that these attributes are shaped by historical, sociocultural, and intergroup dynamics and can be related to an attribute, attitudes, or common interests.
Studies emphasize the importance of social identification in explaining individual, collective, institutionalized, and noninstitutionalized political acts (Fowler & Kam, 2007; Huddy, 2003; P erez, 2015) . Verba et al. (1995) argue that awareness of belonging to a group with shared political interest increases political participation by raising political engagement. From a social-psychological perspective, Van Zomeren et al. (2008) explain the link between social identification and collective action by way of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) . They observe that if individuals perceive illegitimate status differences between what they perceive as their group and other groups, they are likelier to identify with their group and engage in collective action to address any perceived group differential.
Social psychology researchers have explored social identification's effect on mobilization for collective action (for an overview, see, e.g., Klandermans, 2014) . Klandermans (2002) found correlations between social identification, organizational involvement, and preparedness to participate in peaceful protest in South Africa. Van Zomeren et al. (2008) demonstrate in their meta-analysis that social identity affects likelihood to engage in collective action, whereby politicized identities (e.g., feminism) showed a greater effect than nonpoliticized identities (e.g., women). American political scientists have recognized social identification-race, in particular-as crucial for explaining high levels of political participation among certain groups, such as African Americans (Lee, 2008; Olsen, 1970) .
Social identification differs from categorization in that individuals themselves do not need to recognize their ascribed categories or similarly categorized individuals as members of the same group (Jenkins, 2014) . As Lee (2008) promotes, we should therefore examine whether individuals actually identify with their ascribed labels. Scholars who use identity as an analytical category run the risk of reifying categorization, which distorts our understanding of social behavior (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000) . Categorization left unquestioned, moreover, can perpetuate stigmatization and prejudices.
How, then, should we handle issues of identity that are quite problematic as analytical categories but still salient in individuals' daily lives and organizational processes? In line with social psychology literature, we define social identification as the characteristic of a person in which self-image is derived from the social groups identified with (Klandermans, 2014) . Additionally, we propose use of the term "identification" instead of "identity," in keeping with Brubaker and Cooper (2000) . The verb "identify" and its related form, "identification," has a processual connotation, suggesting that identification with social groups is something in flux. Situational and subject to social contexts, identification can undeniably influence individuals' daily lives. But unlike the concept of identity, identification does not assume a homogenous identity, a distinctiveness, or internal sameness among individuals who identify with the same social group (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000) . Identification also puts emphasis on the agents who "identify" themselves. This action-oriented word evokes a more subjective, internalized sense of group belonging and permits individuals to identify to varying extents with different social groups (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Huddy, 2003; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Slootman, 2014) .
Identification Processes Among Immigrants
Despite acknowledging that social identification among immigrants is hybrid, constructed, and conditional (Slootman, 2014; Verkuyten, 2004) , studies have still primarily differentiated between the effects of national (or receiving country) identification and ethnic or origin-country identification to understand immigrants' behavior across social domains (Berry, 1997) . In general, national identification-identification with the destination country-is expected to encourage different forms of social, economic, and political participation among immigrants, while ethnic identification-often used for identification with the origin country-is expected to do the opposite. Over time, immigrants and their descendants give up their distinctive languages, norms, identities, and practices to become part of the mainstream (Alba & Nee, 1997) . The expectation is that these individuals become enabled to participate more in various domains of the receiving society, including its political system (Bloemraad & Vermeulen, 2014 ). An empirical example is given by Klandermans et al. (2008) , showing that ethnic identification correlates negatively with participation in collective action in the Netherlands and in New York among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants.
Alongside their national and ethnic categories, Muslim immigrants in Europe may identify with their religion (Van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016) . 2 The expected effects of religious identification on political participation are not consistent. Campbell (2013) sees that religiosity affects political participation positively because religious groups provide strong recruitment networks and incentivize their members' involvement in civic matters. Wald, Silverman, and Fridy (2005) describe how religion provides believers with social identities that can motivate political activity. Analyzing religious identification's effect on political participation among Muslim immigrants in Europe, Fleischmann, Phalet, and Klein (2011) show that Muslims who identify strongly with their faith are likeliest to be involved in political action. Cesari (2014) and Just, Sandovici, and Listhaug (2014) find that Muslim immigrants who are exposed to religious organizations participate politically significantly more than those who are not. However, Just et al. (2014) also find that those who self-identify as Muslim practice significantly less political participation. Islamic identification in a non-Muslim environment may be accompanied by feelings of exclusion, which may decrease Muslim voters' willingness to participate in democratic European political systems (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2011) . Some Muslim immigrants may consider it against their faith to participate in democratic Western systems (Just et al., 2014) , which may also decrease levels of political participation among those who self-identify as Muslim.
Social psychological theories elaborate the effects of social identity and identification on collective action, although they can also be applied to other forms of political participation, such as voting. Compared to collective action, voting is efficient and affordable. Dickson and Scheve (2006) find significant consensus that social identities affect voting behavior, citing religion and ethnicity as examples of categories that structure electoral choices, for example, by offering individuals common policy preferences (Dickson & Scheve, 2006) . If social identification affects voting behavior by providing the perception of shared policy preferences, it is also likely to affect individuals' likelihood to vote in the first place (Lee, 2008) . Social identification can affect voting both positively and negatively. After all, individuals may have less incentive to vote if none of the parties or politicians represents the group interests and policy preferences.
We propose the following hypotheses:
H1: Origin-country identification affects voting probability. H2: Religious identification affects voting probability.
Processes of Dual Identification
Simon and Klandermans (2001) argue that a politicized social identity is always "nested," which involves individuals identifying with both a subordinate group and the superordinate group. For a subordinate group's identification to become politicized, feelings of connectedness to a superordinate group must exist, as it provides a receptacle to individuals' feelings of entitlement for support (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) . Applying the reasoning of "nested" politicized social identity specifically to immigrants, Simon and Grabow (2010) define dual identity by indexing the aggrieved subordinate group as the immigrant group and the superordinate group, or higher societal entity, as the destination country and its native inhabitants (see also Simon & Ruhs, 2008) .
Other scholars, meanwhile, have highlighted the possible effects of combined nested processes of identification on levels of immigrant participation. Berry (1997) identifies four immigrant integration strategies in which national and ethnic identifications are the main dimensions. He differentiates between individuals who identify with both their ethnic group and the destination country, those who identify with either, and those who identify with neither. He notes that those who highly identify with both participate more in the different domains of the receiving society than those who identify with only one or neither, although Berry later scrutinizes and adjusts his own assessment of the classification. Demands and expectations of the receiving society strongly influence immigrant identification, rendering its various processes and related integration strategies multifaceted and, to a large extent, involuntary (Berry & Sabatier, 2011; Van Oudenhoven, Ward, & Masgoret, 2006) .
We apply the dual identification model not only to the conventional combination of origin country with national identifications, but also to religious identification as a form of identifying with a subordinate group (Klandermans, 2014) . Identifying as Muslim can also be an indication of belonging to an aggrieved subordinate group, since Muslims form a minority and are increasingly stigmatized in Western Europe. Immigrants' dual identity on the basis of origin country or religion is only expected to enhance voting likelihood if it is combined with higher levels of national identification.
H3:
Origin country and religious identifications increase voting probability the more individuals nationally identify.
The Politicization of Social Identification Through Perception of Shared Grievances
Scholars across disciplines have uniquely conceptualized how social identification affects political participation. A common pattern seems to be that social identification becomes politicized under certain conditions. Social identification does not necessarily affect political participation. Perceived common interests are not a necessity for identifying with a social group, as social identification can also provide individuals with a point of self-reference (Lee, 2008) . Within this line of research, social identification is linked to political participation through group consciousness, which is defined by McClain, Johnson Carew, Walton, and Watts (2009) as "in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one's group's social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests" (p. 476).
If individuals who belong to a minority group perceive shared grievances, they may seek to improve group status by engaging in collective action that affirms their group's worth (P erez, 2015) . Klandermans (2002) finds that perception of shared grievances often relates to dissatisfaction with the group's treatment by authorities. Shared grievances can include perceptions of illegitimate inequality, imposed grievances, a transgression of moral principles (such as violation of human rights), and threatened privileges. Van Zomeren et al. (2008) observe how perception of shared grievances intensifies group-based emotions, such as anger, which can move individuals to collective action that addresses the perceived injustices. Simon and Klandermans (2001) see the prerequisites for the politicization of social identification 3 as social identification combined with perception of shared grievances, an external agent to blame for them, and the willingness to involve society at large. Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk (1981) argue that social identification, perception of shared grievances, and the belief that the system is to be blamed has had a strong joint effect on voting probability in the U.S. presidential elections among African Americans, women, and the poor.
Research on the political participation of religious groups has yielded similar results. Wald et al. (2005) find that their political mobilization is often reactive, responding to what they perceive as social flaws, attacks on sacred values, and antireligious practices. Bader (2007) argues that conservative religious groups become politically active not when they set out political goals or interest to join the liberal public sphere, but when they are denied their way of life. Just et al. (2014) see that, especially among Muslim immigrants in Europe with a negative attitude towards the destination country, a reactive identity emerges as a way to deal with perceived discrimination and injustice. That identity increases political participation among the group in an effort to create conditions enabling the practice of their beliefs. Individuals who identify to a lesser extent with a social group-be it origin country, race, or religion-are likelier to abstain from efforts to improve group status because it is less essential to their self-image. If possible, they may disassociate themselves from the group.
Perception of shared grievances is expected to enhance origin country and religious identifications' effects on voting. It provides individuals with common interests-specifically, to address injustices towards their group and therefore to participate politically.
H4:
Origin country and religious identifications increase voting probability the more individuals perceive shared grievances.
Bringing dual identification and the perception of group grievances together into the framework of how social identification becomes politicized, Simon and Klandermans (2001) highlight the importance of considering both the perception of shared grievances as well as feeling connected to a superordinate group. They state that "politicized collective identity is always also nested identity in that it presupposes identification with the more inclusive social entity that provides the context for shared grievances, adversarial attributions, and the ensuing power struggles for social change (or resistance to such change)" (p. 326). Klandermans and Stekelenburg (2013) argue, moreover, that individuals who hold a dual identity and harbor feelings of dissatisfaction are likelier to engage in collective action. An empirical example is given by Simon and Grabow (2010) , who find that the politicization of dual identification among Russian immigrants is moderated by a perception of shared grievances.
H5: Origin country and religious identifications' effects increase voting probability the more individuals perceive shared grievances and nationally identify.
Group Resources and National Context
Scholars from various disciplines point out that group-specific factors-namely, political leadership, recruitment networks, and group resources-can influence how social identification gets politicized by enabling different forms of political participation. Simon and Klandermans (2001) argue that leaders play a role in the politicization of social identification by emphasizing shared grievances, identifying an external agent that is responsible, and defining how society at large is implicated. Politicians can try to persuade individuals to understand themselves and their own interests through identifying with a social group (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 4) . Still, politicians differ in the extent to which they make group-based appeals or address specific group interests in order to attract votes (Dickson & Scheve, 2006) . Klandermans (2014) finds that individuals are also likelier to participate in a political protest the more they identify with the organizers. But not every social group has leaders, political or otherwise, who exploit social identification to mobilize individuals or with whom individuals can identify to the extent that they participate politically. And when they do, the leaders are not all influential and do not necessarily make group appeals to the same extent. Klandermans and Stekelenburg (2013) demonstrate how social networks extend opportunities to discuss politics and political events, as well as expose individuals to recruitment networks. Groups can provide strong recruitment networks that mobilize individuals to vote. Verba et al. (1995, p. 152) claim that individuals are likelier to participate politically if they are asked to by someone with whom they share demographic features, such as gender, ethnicity, or race. The immigration literature posits that ethnic networks can also provide immigrants and their children with various resources (Portes & Zhou, 1993, p. 86) . From a social capital perspective, Tillie (2004) shows that individual networks as well as groups' social capital affect individuals' likelihood to participate politically, voting included. Vermeulen and Br€ unger (2014) demonstrate how differences in group resources, such as the form of a cohesive social network, affect immigrants' organizational capacity. They find that the Netherlands' Turkish community, characterized by strong cohesive social networks and strong transnational relationships, can offer sufficient legitimacy for its organizations. The Netherlands' Moroccan community, characterized by more fragmented social networks, must look beyond its own to gain sufficient legitimacy for its organizations. Van Heelsum (2005) attributes part of Turkish political participation in the Netherlands to the strong networks between religious groupings. In other words, alongside individuals' determinants of political participation, group characteristics are expected to affect political participation in various ways (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Michon & Vermeulen, 2013) .
How perception of shared grievances moderates origin country and religious identifications' effects on voting-and how this is subsequently strengthened by national identification-differs across immigrant groups.
H6:
The extent of origin country and religious identifications' effects on voting probability, combined with perception of shared grievances and national identification, differs across immigrant groups.
Finally, all of our hypothesized relationships are subject to context. This calls our attention to the supply side of political participation vis-a-vis voting in the national elections. Countries differ in how they accommodate and voice group-specific interests within the electoral system. Moreover, not every country has the same extent of influence from political actors who pursue group-specific interests. Country characteristics such as the political opportunity structure, public discourse, citizenship regimes, and institutional arrangements affect which opportunities are presented to permit pursuit of shared interests based on social identification.
The extent to which group-specific interests of immigrants are recognized and accommodated by national integration regimes are likely to affect the politicization of origin country and religious identifications. Koopmans and colleagues argue that citizenship-rights regimes affect opportunities for claims making on the basis of ethnic and religious interests (Carol & Koopmans, 2013; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005) . Cinalli and Giugni (2016) indicate that the political-opportunity structure affects electoral political participation among Muslims in Western Europe, while Muslim individuals participate more in institutional and cultural political-opportunity structures that are more open. Research has looked into the traditional distinction between immigrant citizenship regimesthe United Kingdom being the prototype for multiculturalism and France for assimilation-with such studies often offering nuanced and/or critical views (Favell, 1998; Koopmans et al., 2005) . Verkuyten (2016) shows how opportunity structures most greatly influence dual identification's effect on intent to protest when individuals are exposed to open multiculturalist regimes versus closed assimilationist regimes.
One indicator of a multiculturalist citizenship regime is the level of openness to minority claims. Statham and Tillie (2016) provide a recent overview of just that for the countries included in this study, finding that Germany and Switzerland are characterized by a more ethnic approach to citizenship, where cultural distinctiveness among minority groups is not supported. The United Kingdom is characterized by a multiculturalist approach, which is more open to group demands and organization along racial or ethnic lines. Belgium recognizes group demands to greater or lesser extents depending on the region (Statham & Tillie, 2016; Koopmans et al., 2005) .
H7: Origin country and religious identifications, combined with perception of shared grievances and national identification, increase voting probability in countries that are more accommodating of immigrants' group demands (United Kingdom) compared to countries that are less accommodating of immigrants' group demands (Germany and Switzerland). 
Data and Methods
The data for this study were gathered in 2011 under the European research project EURISLAM. The computer-assisted telephone interviewing was conducted by bilingual interviewers, who selected respondents based on surnames that typically originate from predominately Muslim countries. Included were Moroccans, Turks, "Yugoslavs"-shorthand for people from countries comprising the former Yugoslavia-and Pakistanis and people from its region in Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 4 A selection was made of those who could vote during the most recent national elections. This produced a sample of 1,927 individuals: 470 Moroccans, 652 Turks, 346 Yugoslavs, and 459 Pakistanis and people from its region (see Table 1 ).
We used binary logistic regression analyses to deal with the nonlinearity and nonnormality of the distribution of errors of the dependent variable, whether someone voted during the last national elections. 5 To account for the nested nature of the data, we clustered the standard errors according to country and immigrant-group combinations, 16 in total. We included dummies for the countries to account for voting-level variance between them. The results are presented in log odds, whereby less-than-zero represents a negative relative effect and greater-than-zero represents a relative positive effect.
The dependent variable concerns self-reported political behavior: voting in elections that were held between half a year to four years before the survey (which was conducted between January and June 2011). Using self-reported voting as a variable has a few drawbacks, including possible overreporting for social desirability, differences between countries due to some elections being longer ago than others, and the impact of news events.
6 Furthermore, the perception of suitable political 
Operationalization
Identification and Grievances
Our analysis drew distinctions between national, origin country, and religious identifications. National identification was measured through a question concerning to what extent respondents saw themselves as Belgian, British, German, or Swiss. Origin-country identification and religious identifications were measured through questions concerning to what extent respondents saw themselves as Moroccan, Turkish, Yugoslav (subdivided into present-day national groups), or Pakistani (or other origin-country identifications from the region) and as Muslim. Five-answer categories ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly).
We included an indicator for perception of shared grievances that asks respondents how often they thought people of a certain origin country and Muslims experience hostility or unfair treatment in the destination country because of their ethnicity of the country of origin or Islamic faith. Fouranswer categories ranged from 1 (never) to 4 (frequently). We included interaction effects for national and origin-country identifications and religious and national identifications to account for dual identification's effect on voting. Additionally, we included interaction effects for origin-country identification with perception of shared grievances of immigrants from the origin country and with religious identification and perception of shared grievances of Muslims in society.
Based on Simon and Klandermans' (2001) finding that social identification becomes politicized if people feel part of mainstream society, we assumed that origin country and religious identifications would increase voting probability if individuals perceived shared grievances and also nationally identify. To account for this claim, we constructed a new variable that produces four categories comprising combinations of perception of few and many grievances of Muslims and immigrants of the same origin country with low and high national identifiers (see Tables A1 and A2 ). The continuous variables national identification and perception of shared grievances of Muslims and of immigrants from the same origin country were split into two groups on the basis of mean value. Next, we interacted this variable with religious and origin-country identifications to test Hypothesis 5. The interaction between the combined variable for national identification and shared grievances with religious and origin-country identifications was then interacted with immigrant groups and with countries to test Hypotheses 6 and 7. We also tested Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7, using three-way interaction effects with the original continuous variables. The results were similar. We chose to use the method outlined in this section because the graphs proved easier to understand than a marginal-effects plot for a threeway interaction effect with three continuous variables.
Control Variables
In our analysis, we include several indicators that could affect voting probability, social identification patterns, and perception of shared grievances.
In their oft-cited work, Verba and Nie (1972, p. 125) argue that possessing human and financial capital increases civic attitudes, such as interest in politics, which consequently enhances voting. We used some of the standard control variables included in most research about voting such as gender, level of education, and age-for which we also included a quadratic term to account for its nonlinear effect on voting. We measured education by total years of education. We also controlled for whether the respondent held a paid job of over 12 hours per week.
Some explanations for political participation relate specifically to the migrant experience. Getting familiar with and feeling connected to the political system and acquiring language takes time and affects political participation, especially for the first generation (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001 ). Additionally, political experiences in the origin country, notably if a nondemocratic regime, influence immigrants' attitudes towards the political system in the destination country (Bloemraad & Sch€ onw€ alder, 2013) .
We recognized that some immigrant-specific characteristics might affect voting. We differentiated between Moroccans, Turks, Yugoslavs, Pakistanis, and people from its region. To explore possible differences between individuals who identified with varying religious denominations, we also differentiated between Ahmadiyya, Alevi, Shiite, Sunni, and other Muslims. We differentiated between firstgeneration immigrants, immigrants who migrated up until age 16 (also referred to as the "in-between generation"), and second-generation immigrants. Daily language usage was taken into account by asking in which language respondents read newspapers or watch television. Five-answer options ranged from 1 (always in language of destination country) to 5 (always in my parents' mother tongue).
Finally, exposure to recruitment networks and the composition of social networks are also recognized as potentially affecting voter turnout (Verba et al., 1995) . We included a question asking how many destination-country natives respondents trust, discuss important matters with, and with whom they frequently meet. We expected immigrants with more native friends to identify somewhat less with their origin country or religious group and to be likelier to vote as they felt more connected to the destination country and could get more information about the electoral system from their friends. Since network diversity may also impact political participation, we included a quadratic term for number of native friends in the destination country, expecting that having friends from multiple groups affects individuals' political participation.
The categories for education, native friends, and Islamic denomination generated a relatively high number of missing values. To limit their influence on the estimates, we attributed the variables' missing values with the mean values of the sample and recoded them into dummies (for description variables, see Tables A3 and A4) .
We also included country dummies to account for the variation across countries in voting probability (for distribution of voting over countries, see Table A5 ).
Results
Identification and Perception of Shared Grievances
Interpreting our results, we first looked at social identification's effect sizes on voting probability. We did this in a model with only the dummies for countries included. Second, we analyzed all the main effects. In a stepwise approach, we then included the interaction of identification with perceived shared grievances, national identification, and immigrant groups.
Concerning the models in Table 2 that include one form of social identification, only origincountry identification had a significant effect, as it decreased voting probability. We found no effect of religious identification. We found support for Hypothesis 1, but not for Hypothesis 2.
Model 4 included the control variables. The effect of origin-country identification held when these control variables are added. There were several control variables that influence voting probability. National identification increased it. Respondents with a majority of native friends were likelier to vote than those with friend groups who comprised half or fewer individuals of native background.
7 Alevi Source. EURISLAM (2011) Note. The dummies for the missing values of education, native friends in country of destination, and Islamic denomination are included but not reported. The standard errors are clustered on country-group combinations. † p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Muslims were likelier to vote than Sunni. Middle-aged respondents were likelier to vote than younger respondents, though no statistically significant difference appeared between the oldest and youngest respondents and their voting probability. Having more years of education also increased voting probability. Individuals who worked for over 12 hours a week were likelier to vote than those working less.
Dual Identification
Origin country and national identifications have interactive effects on voting probability, as does religious identification (H3). Graph 1 shows the predicted voting probabilities for individuals who nationally identify not at all or very strongly for different values of origin country and religious identifications. The marginal effects (not reported) show that origin-country identification decreases voting probability, with the exception of individuals who nationally identify very strongly; for them, origincountry identification does not affect voting probability. Among individuals who identify as Muslim strongly or very strongly, those who also strongly nationally identify are likelier to vote than those who do not at all nationally identify. Religious identification decreases voting probability slightly among individuals who do not at all nationally identify, while it increases probability among individuals who very strongly nationally identify. Nevertheless, the marginal effects (not reported) indicate that the positive effect of religious identification was solely significant among individuals who nationally identify very strongly. .7
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Low national identification High national identification Graph 1. Predicted voting probabilities for respondents who nationally identify "not at all" or "very strongly" for different values of origin country and religious identifications (95% confidence interval).
Perception of Shared Grievances
Graph 2 shows predicted voting probability for individuals who perceive no grievances and many grievances of immigrants from the origin country. Among individuals who identify very strongly with their origin country, those who perceive many grievances are likelier to vote than those who perceive no shared grievances, thus providing support for Hypothesis 4. Origin-country identification decreases voting probability for individuals who perceive no shared grievances of immigrants from the same origin country. 8 The conditional effect of perception of shared grievances cancels out the initial difference in voting probability for individuals who identify strongly with their origin country and those who do so to a lesser degree. Perception of shared grievances can therefore have a small (not significant) mobilizing effect for individuals who identify strongly with their origin country, while it has a discouraging effect for individuals who identify so to a lesser degree. We do not find these effects for respondents who identify strongly with their religion and perceive shared religious grievances.
Dual Identification Combined With the Perception of Shared Grievances
Graph 3 shows the average marginal effect of origin-country identification for the four combinations of low or high national identification with perception of few or many shared grievances of immigrants from the same origin country. We see that origin-country identification decreases voting probability for individuals who perceive few shared grievances, regardless of their national identification. However, it increases voting probability for individuals who perceive many grievances of immigrants from the same origin country and who strongly nationally identify. It does not affect voting probability for individuals who perceive many shared grievances but nationally identify to a lesser degree. These findings provide support for Simon and Klandermans (2001) , underscoring how important perception of shared grievances and the "nested" character of politicized social identification are. The graph highlights the need to evaluate perception of shared grievances and national identification when investigating size and direction of origin-country identification's effect on voting. Graph 2. Predicted voting probabilities for individuals who "never" and "frequently" perceive shared grievances of immigrants from the same country of origin for different values of origin country identifications (95% confidence interval).
Interaction effects between national identification, religious identification, and perception of shared grievances of Muslims in society did not reach significance.
Differences Across Groups and Countries
Now we turn to whether the main effects of social identification and its conditional effect of perceived shared grievances and national identification differ across immigrant groups (H6).
We expected origin-country identification to produce various effects on voting probability across immigrant groups. The politicization of religious identification could also depend on group resources, which can differ across immigrant groups. Turkish immigrants in some European countries largely conduct their religious organization according to origin country (Vermeulen, 2013) . It was appropriate, therefore, to explore whether the conditional effect of extent of religious identification on voting probability differs across immigrant groups. Here we found no differences concerning the interaction effects of origin-country identification and the four groups with varying levels of national identification and perception of shared grievances of immigrants from the same origin country. We did, however, find significant differences across immigrant groups for the interaction effects with religious identification and the four groups with varying levels of national identification and perception of shared grievances of Muslims.
Graph 4 shows that religious identification increases voting probability among Moroccans and Turks who strongly nationally identify and perceive many shared grievances of Muslims. This provides support for our earlier finding of a politicized "nested" character of social identification in which both connectedness with the mainstream society and perception of shared grievances are of main Graph 3. Origin country identification's effect on voting probability for different values of national identifications and for different values of individuals' perception of shared grievances of individuals from the same country of origin (95% confidence interval).
-. importance (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) . Religious identification decreases voting probability among Moroccans and Yugoslavs who nationally identify to a lesser degree and perceive many shared grievances of Muslims. Religious identification decreases voting probability among Turks who perceive few shared grievances of Muslims and nationally identify to a lesser degree. Religious identification does not affect voting probability among immigrants from Pakistan and its region, regardless of their national identification or perception of shared grievances of Muslims. Graph 4 indicates that for religious identification's effect on voting to emerge, we must consider perception of shared grievances, national identification, and differences across groups. To properly understand social identification's effect on political participation, overall, we thus identified a need to consider group differences alongside perception of shared grievances and feelings of connectedness to the mainstream society.
Returning to country differences (H7), we did not find significant differences between the four countries in terms of origin identification's effect on voting probability. 9 We did find differences between countries when we examined religious identification's effect on voting for the four groups with varying levels of national identification and perception of shared grievances of Muslims. Graph 5 shows that religious identification increases voting probability among individuals who perceive few grievances of Muslims and who have high national identification in Germany, while it decreases it among this group in Belgium. Religious identification also decreases voting probability among low national identifiers who perceive few grievances of Muslims in Switzerland, while it increases it among high national identifiers who perceive many grievances of Muslims. Switzerland and the United Kingdom, in part (p 5 .064), show that religious identification can increase voting probability among individuals who perceive both many grievances as well as high levels of national identification. It again seems to support the "nested" character of politicized identities (Simon & Klandermans, 2001 ). Based on accommodation and recognition of cultural diversity, we would have expected to see a difference between the United Kingdom and Germany, and Switzerland. We did not find these differences in the analyses.
Conclusion
The identity-to-politics link assumes that processes of social identification among immigrant groups enhance political participation. Individuals who share a demographic label are assumed to share common interests that they collectively pursue. But mixed empirical results have led scholars to conclude that such a link is difficult to identify. Some even question its political relevance. To reiterate, Lee (2008) calls for "unpacking" the presumed relationship between social identification and political participation to better understand how the two phenomena work. P erez (2015) concludes that connecting group identity to political attitudes and behavior can only happen under certain circumstances. He calls for further research on differences in group attachment to learn more about when group identity is politicized, among whom, and under which circumstances. Our study attempted to provide deeper insights into these matters by analyzing how processes of social identification combined with other elements, such as perception of shared grievances and group resources, have specific effects for specific individuals. Our findings support the assumption that identification with social groups affects political participation for certain individuals under specific circumstances.
Our study also emphasizes the importance of questioning the assumption that individuals who share a demographic label will necessarily show a certain pattern of political behavior (Lee, 2008) . We argue that the effect for voting is conditional. Often, immigrants are categorized under origin country, ethnicity, or religion. Immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries are increasingly defined by their religion. By ascribing these labels in both scientific studies and popular debates, we perpetuate the assumption that groups of individuals are homogenous in the first place. This ignores how individuals who, despite being given a certain label, can differ from each other and how these differences, in turn, inform social behavior. Ignoring the diversity may reinforce stereotyping and stigmatization. We run the risk of associating social behavior with artificially grouped individuals on the basis of a demographic feature while the individuals themselves do not consider the feature important, if even existent, in their daily lives.
So what do our results mean for the larger research question: When and among whom does group identity affect voting? First, in line with the immigration literature, we found that in Western Europe, Muslim immigrants from Morocco, Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Pakistan and its region who strongly identify with their origin country are less inclined to vote. They feel more attached to their origin country and tend less to pursue possible common interests in their destination countries. National identification, by contrast, encourages voting.
Second, the identity-to-politics-link and how individuals pursue collective interests is conditional and context-specific. Some of the results in which we combine different levels of identification and/or perceptions of shared grievances illustrate this and provide further insight into these complicated relations. Respondents who strongly identify with their origin country and perceive shared grievances of immigrants from the same origin country are likelier to vote. We do not see the same result for religious identification across all surveyed immigrant groups and countries.
Religious identification does not increase voting probability for all immigrants similarly. Individuals who feel strongly attached to their religion combined with strong attachment to the destination country show higher levels of voting probability. Origin-country identification only increases voting probability combined with higher levels of national identification for those who perceive many shared grievances of individuals from the same origin country. These different combinations of origin country and religious identifications in interaction with national identification and perception of shared grievances seem to encourage Muslims immigrants in Western Europe to pursue the collective interests of their respective origin countries and/or religious groups. Processes of politicized identification can only emerge if there is at least some connection to the receiving society. If missing, minority members will have nothing to "fight" for and thus refrain from political participation. This illustrates the value of inclusive societies in which all citizens, regardless of background, feel that they genuinely belong, and it is worth their while to participate. Exclusion and segregation lead to isolation and apathy.
Finally, our results indicate that we should evaluate differences between groups, as underscored by our analyses of religious identification. Religious identification's effect on voting only emerged when we took immigrant group and country differences into account. More research is needed to determine whether the differences across groups are due to group resources, such as political leaders and cohesive networks, or any of the other factors at play. Additionally, the differences between countries were small and showed no clear pattern. We therefore found no support that origin country or religious identifications' effects on voting probability depend on the accommodation of immigrant-group demands and corresponding national policies. Other studies that find no pronounced differences between official citizenship regimes and minority groups' civic and political behavior explain this by arguing that national regimes are often detached from local integration policy practices (Bertossi & Duyvendak, 2012) .
Our study signals that we should consider the specific characteristics of social categories when researching social identification's effect on voting. This probably holds for other forms of political participation as well. Previous research often conceptualized social minority identities as a collective category or focused solely on origin country and national identifications. We show that religious identification, alongside origin-country identification, can affect voting probability under certain conditions among Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. Our findings also indicate that we should consider group differences as a moderator of social identification's effect on political participation. Moreover, our findings indicate that origin country and religious identifications affect voting differently, depending, inter alia, on perception of shared grievances and group differences. This is a compelling conclusion for contemporary European societies in which many minority groups-Muslim communities particularly-face considerable stigmatization, discrimination, and marginalization. Addressing these inequalities via political engagement can help mobilize individuals to participate in the democratic process. However, this can only happen if they feel some level of connection to the receiving society.
Research is needed to understand better what types of social identification affect the political participation of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe. When undertaking such study, we should look beyond origin and destination countries as categories and take into account other forms of political participation. Necessary to examine, too, is the effect that political participation's supply side has on the researched mechanisms of social identification, perception of shared grievances, and group differences. Meanwhile, we should consider every type of social identification as having its own specific characteristics that can affect political participation differently, depending on perception of shared grievances, group differences, and the larger political context. .000 .000
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